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UNHCR in Uganda: better than its reputation suggests
Will Jones
Mistrust and fear abound among Rwandan refugees in Uganda. The dearth of information 
available about cessation urgently needs to be addressed by UNHCR. 
Nakivale Refugee Settlement on Uganda’s 
border with Rwanda is one of Africa’s oldest 
refugee camps. Rwandans first fled there 
following the ‘Hutu Revolution’ of 1957 and 
it now contains roughly 60,000 Rwandans, 
Congolese and Somalis along with many other 
nationalities (some of its residents like to say 
they live in the real Organisation of African 
Unity). This is not the choked ghetto usually 
evoked by media representations. Nakivale 
is a confederation of villages and contains 
enough farming and animal husbandry to 
feed itself and still produce surplus to export 
further afield. And though Nakivale is in 
the middle of nowhere, it is anything but 
isolated from cultural, social and economic 
activity; there are markets, several cinemas 
and plenty of smartphones in evidence 
taking advantage of the new mobile phone 
mast erected in the centre of the settlement. 
Successive upheavals, pogroms and – of 
course – the genocide of 1994 and its aftermath 
have contributed to successive waves of 
Rwandans to Uganda. After the genocide and 
the coming to power of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, most of the old caseload of Rwandans 
returned and were gradually replaced by a 
new cadre of disgruntled military officers, 
human rights activists, journalists who had 
fallen foul of stringent new media regulations, 
and those who had simply fallen foul of the 
politics of land in post-genocide Rwanda, 
where the abrupt return of the old caseload 
created many vicious conflicts over who 
owned what, with the losers of those disputes 
often having to leave the country in a hurry. 
Cessation
The current Rwandan government maintains 
that contemporary Rwanda is peaceful, that 
the refugees of Nakivale can return safely, 
and that the only Rwandans with anything 
to fear are perpetrators of the genocide who 
must return to face the justice of the courts. It 
has made a sufficiently persuasive argument 
that the government of Uganda and UNHCR 
have agreed to invoke the Cessation Clause 
which states, broadly, that if the reasons 
why refugee status were originally granted 
no longer apply, a refugee “can no longer…
continue to refuse to avail himself of the 
protection of the country of his nationality”. 
The Rwandans in the camps themselves 
have fiercely resisted the clause. They have 
argued that the Rwandan government 
remains, among other things, dictatorial and 
intolerant of views which diverge from its 
own. They have been trying for the best part 
of the last decade to convince international 
agencies, governments, NGOs and just 
about anyone else that they should not be 
forced to go home. They believe they now 
face forced deportation, arbitrary violence, 
extrajudicial assassination and worse. 
In interviews with these Rwandans, I found 
a giant gap between what UNHCR staff had 
told me in Kampala and Mbarara (the regional 
capital) and what these refugees believed. 
UNHCR staff had patiently explained to 
me that the process had been delayed until 
capacity was in place to screen individuals 
to prevent mistakes, that safeguards were 
in place and that the government of Uganda 
had no interest in a politically embarrassing 
series of forced deportations. But Rwandans 
in the camp had no idea what UNHCR 
had done on their behalf, had secured for 
them, or was trying to do, despite their 
smartphones and internet access. Around 
the settlement you will encounter plenty of 
signs encouraging you to use a condom or a 
malaria net but you won’t find much by way of 
public service announcements regarding the 
current advocacy or inter-governmental work 
of UNHCR. There is a UNHCR compound 82 General articles
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behind barbed wire and concrete walls but 
even if you did get in, the staff who could 
give an informed answer are in Kampala or 
Mbarara. On the UNHCR website, information 
for the refugees in Nakivale is non-existent. 
Consequences of silence
There are four problems with this. First, the 
information black hole left by UNHCR is 
fertile ground for rumour, misinformation 
and distortion of the facts. For example, it 
was repeated to me in my interviews that 
UNHCR had been bribed by the Government 
of Rwanda to delay the resettlement of at-
risk refugees to safe countries or just not 
resettle them at all. The true part of this is 
that it does take longer to resettle a Rwandan 
refugee, because many states require that 
the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in Arusha (set up to prosecute the 
organisers of the genocide) clear anyone they 
might resettle as not on the list of suspects. 
This takes a while. But any Rwandan living 
in the camps trying to find a clear and 
authoritative source explaining why her 
Congolese neighbours are being resettled to 
the West when she is not will look in vain. 
Instead, this vacuum is filled with conspiracy 
forums, fear, suspicion and paranoia. 
Second, this silence materially harms the 
interests of legitimate refugees who merit 
resettlement outside Uganda. The process, 
which includes identifying a case for 
resettlement, verifying the facts and assisting 
the individuals or family through the often 
idiosyncratic procedures of specific countries, 
is an extremely long and stressful procedure. 
Many of the problems with the process 
are not unique to Rwandans; repeatedly 
interviewing trauma victims about the details 
of their abuse that occurred more than a 
decade earlier and using any inconsistency 
as grounds for rejection has more than a 
few obvious problems. But in this instance, 
with no reason to trust UNHCR, Rwandan 
refugees often omit details from their 
interviews with UNHCR which they are 
subsequently willing to discuss in their 
interviews with putative host governments. 
This means that there are disparities between 
the initial UNHCR resettlement interviews 
and the later interviews with governments. 
In consequence legitimate cases fall apart 
due to inconsistencies in refugees’ stories.
Thirdly, this makes it harder for UNHCR 
itself. The ability of UNHCR to act effectively, 
and to help the people it wishes to help, is 
increased hugely when the communities 
it works with understand and trust it 
and are willing to work with it. Indeed, 
communication is a first step to moving 
beyond thinking of sides and instead thinking 
of a set of problems about which UNHCR and 
refugees can collaborate in finding solutions.
Finally, and most simply, if individuals 
feel deprived of the most basic information 
about their fate this feeds into a deep and 
pervasive sense of hopelessness, abandonment 
and marginalisation. Many articulate and 
intelligent individuals had written letters, 
petitions and testimonies to UNHCR, to 
Amnesty and to Human Rights Watch. 
Nobody ever replied to them. Often these 
are individuals hanging on with their 
fingernails to a sense of themselves as 
more than a human cargo. To keep people 
informed about their futures is about more 
than utility; it is about dignity and respect.
Simple steps to improve communications
Overcoming the caustic legacy of mistrust 
which now pervades Nakivale will be 
difficult but UNHCR could make some 
simple moves in the right direction. 
Nakivale is online. People who have internet 
access print out articles for those that do not. 
News can and does move round the settlement 
quite quickly. UNHCR could overcome several 
of the huge information deficits in Nakivale 
very quickly if it supported a simple, clear and 
authoritative news platform in the languages 
that people in the camps speak, giving them 
basic information about what is going on; even 
if it was only in English or French, translation 
would get it round the camps pretty quickly, 
albeit sometimes unreliably. For example: 
How does cessation work? Who is exempted? 
If they believe they are exempted, how General articles 83
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should they go about demonstrating that? 
What rights are they currently guaranteed in 
Uganda? Who should they talk to for what? 
If they believe they are going to be forcibly 
deported illegally, whom should they call?  
Refugees themselves possess much 
communications infrastructure. There 
are radio stations in the camps set up 
and owned by refugees. Such outlets 
could and should be used to promote 
UNHCR’s message inside the camps. 
And finally, a lot of the necessary 
infrastructure already exists. Local partner 
organisations, such as the Refugee Law 
Project, have excellent relationships with many 
refugee communities and could be a simple 
and effective conduit for information using 
many of the resources they already possess.
Will Jones william.jones@qeh.ox.ac.uk is a 
research officer at the Refugee Studies Centre. 
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk
Insights from the refugee response in Cameroon
Angela Butel
The integration of Central African refugees into existing Cameroonian communities has had 
far-reaching development impacts on the region and the state as a whole; this observation 
calls us to re-evaluate the significance of smaller-scale, less noticed refugee crises. 
We miss an important opportunity if we 
ignore smaller, less geo-politically prominent 
situations such as that which has been 
unfolding in eastern Cameroon since 2005. 
Despite the lack of media attention it has 
received, this situation offers significant 
insights into how humanitarian responses 
are conducted today and possibilities for 
making them more effective. Rather than 
creating refugee camps to contain the 
influx, humanitarian organisations are 
assisting refugees to integrate into existing 
Cameroonian towns. Mbororo and Gbaya 
people fleeing violence in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) settle into Cameroonian 
Mbororo and Gbaya communities. Many 
refugees have pre-existing family ties with 
Cameroonians and others share languages and 
cultures with them. Humanitarian workers 
cite these shared social ties as a key factor 
behind the success of the integration process.
Assistance to meet the most urgent needs of 
the refugees (emergency food and hygiene 
distributions, water and sanitation, health care 
and education) centres around agriculture: 
distributing seeds and tools and training 
refugee communities in farming techniques. 
This focus on agriculture, however, is in 
itself one of the potential drawbacks of an 
integration model of refugee assistance: that 
of conflict of interests between refugees and 
their host communities. Within Cameroon, 
there has been a long history of enmity 
and conflict between sedentary farming 
communities and nomadic pastoralist 
groups, and disputes over land-use rights are 
common. Many refugees were pastoralists in 
Amadou Hayatou used to be a diamond miner in CAR before fleeing 
violence. Now he works in the field he shares with a cooperative of other 
refugees in Cameroon: “Now my diamonds are my potatoes!” 
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